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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Domestic homicides include killing an intimate partner
1
 out of jealous 
rage, and killing a batterer out of fear and despair.  How the criminal law 
treats these different kinds of domestic homicides continues to challenge 
our sense of justice.  In this Article, I first address the injustice that the 
partial defense of provocation for domestic homicides currently presents.  I 
then discuss why eliminating or modifying the defense will continue to be 
problematic so long as mandatory sentencing persists.  I next turn to the 
recent developments in Australian states, where experimentation in this 
area continues.  I describe and analyze Australia’s continuing debate over 
how the criminal law should respond to different kinds of domestic 
homicides.  Finally, I examine the most recent sweeping change to 
American criminal defense law: Stand Your Ground/Castle laws such as 
                                                          
 Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law. Thanks to Colleen Knix and 
Ian Molitor for their excellent research assistance. 
1
 Domestic homicides also frequently involve the killing of an intimate partner’s lover. 
See infra notes 17-19, and accompanying text. 
1
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Florida’s law.
2
  I suggest that American lawmakers should consider 
enacting a modified version of a recent Australian provision by amending 
the modern Castle laws to provide a presumption of self-defense for 
domestic violence survivors who kill their batterers in their homes or 
vehicles. 
II.  WHAT’S WRONG WITH PROVOCATION 
Professor Aya Gruber provides the latest major U.S. academic 
contribution to this area in her 2014 article, “A Provocative Defense.”
3
  
There she (in her own words) “provocatively”
4
 argues that in the United 
States this defense, in its current form, functions fairly for all forms of 
domestic homicide.  Gruber suggests further that I, and others who voice 
dissatisfaction with American criminal law’s status quo on provocation, are 
misguided.  She charges that we are using “criminal punishment to express 
an anti-masculinity” message
5
 while disregarding the negative impact that 
changing or abolishing the provocation defense would have on young 
minority men “accused of non-intimate homicides and facing murder 
charges in one of the most punitive systems on earth.”
6
 
I respectfully disagree with Professor Gruber’s claim that provocation 
functions fairly and with her portrayal of many of the critics of the current 
form of the provocation defense.  Gruber describes such criticism in purely 
gendered terms.  She says that critics believe provocation “gives male 
defendants a benefit they do not deserve (mitigation) and denies female 
                                                          
 2.  FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2014). 
 3.  See Aya Gruber, A Provocative Defense, 103 CAL. L. REV. 273, 273 (2015) 
[hereinafter Gruber, Provocation] (citing to four of my publications as examples of 
anti-male bias because I seek to distinguish between heat of passion killings and killing 
one’s batterer. Caroline Forell, Gender Equality, Social Values and Provocation Law in 
the United States, Canada and Australia, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 27 
(2006) [hereinafter Forell, Gender Equality] (cited in Gruber, Provocation at 277 n.25, 
293 n.142, 300 n.187, 310 n.253, 311 n.258, 313 n.272, 314 n.280, 315 n.284, 322 
n.331); CAROLINE FORELL & DONNA MATTHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN: THE 
REASONABLE WOMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN (2000) [hereinafter FORELL, A LAW OF 
HER OWN] (cited in Gruber, Provocation at 292 n.135, 296 n.166, 323 n.377); Caroline 
Forell, The Meaning of Equality: Sexual Harassment, Stalking, and Provocation in 
Canada, Australia, and the United States, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 151 (2005) 
[hereinafter Forell, The Meaning of Equality] (cited in Gruber, Provocation at 297 
n.169); Caroline Forell, Homicide and the Unreasonable Man, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
597 (2004) [hereinafter Forell, Homicide] (citied in Gruber, Provocation at 290 n.128, 
291 n.129, 291 n.147, 295 n.155, 324 n.345)). 
 4.  Gruber, Provocation, supra note 3, at 273. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. at 312 (quoting Aya Gruber, Murder, Minority Victims and Mercy, 85 U. 
COLO. L. REV 129, 185 (2014)). 
2
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defendants a better disposition (acquittal).”
7
  However, my criticism of 
provocation, while highlighting the need for substantive equality by taking 
women’s experiences into account,
8
 is based on the degree of culpability of 
certain homicidal conduct regardless of gender.  My concern is that the 
parallel use of provocation for domestic killings out of jealous rage and 
domestic killings out of fear of continuing physical violence is unfair and 
immoral.  The unfairness is exacerbated in jurisdictions that have enacted 




There is a gender chasm when it comes to committing domestic 
homicide.  Men commit many more domestic homicides than women
10
 and 
are much more likely than women to kill out of jealousy.
11
  Furthermore, 
while most male homicide victims are not killed by intimates, most female 
victims of homicide are killed by husbands, lovers, ex-husbands, or ex-
lovers.
12
  Many of these men were batterers before they were killers.
13
  In 




These gendered facts do not mean that it is anti-male to argue that some 
homicides deserve to be treated as murders while others do not, even if, in 
application, this means that more men than women who commit domestic 
homicide will be found to be murderers.
15
  Instead, critics such as myself 
                                                          
 7.  Id. at 314. 
 8.  See Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 3, at 29-30. 
 9.  See id. at 30; see also Carolyn Ramsey, Criminal Law: Provoking Change: 
Comparative Insights on Feminist Homicide Reform, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
33, 83 (2010). 
 10.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 2283556, 
FEMALE VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE (2009) (“Females made up 70% of victims killed by an 
intimate partner in 2007, a proportion that has changed very little since 1993.”). 
 11.  Donna Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & 
WOMEN’S STUD. 71, 91 (1992); Margo J. Wilson & Martin Daly, Who Kills Whom in 
Spouse Killings? On the Exceptional Sex Ratio of Spousal Homicides in the United 
States, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 189, 206 (1992). 
 12.  Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Assessing Risk Factors for Intimate Partner 
Homicide, 250 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 14, 18 (2003).  
 13.  Many men who kill out of jealous rage are batterers whose past conduct makes 
it likely that they are a continuing danger to society and need to be incarcerated. See 
Coker, supra note 11, at 89; R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL P. DOBASH, WHEN MEN 
MURDER WOMEN 82 (2015). 
 14.  CHARLES PATRICK EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL: PSYCHOLOGICAL 
SELF-DEFENSE AS LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 23-31 (1987); Wilson & Daly, supra note 11, 
at 206. 
 15.  Furthermore, since men kill far more often than women, inevitably more men 
than women will be found guilty of murder.   See id. 
3
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assert that different reasons for killing merit different legal responses. 
Anyone who kills another out of possessiveness and anger, where the other 




There is another fairness problem with current provocation law as 
applied in domestic homicide situations: collateral murders.  Many men are 
also victims of domestic homicide by jealous men.
17
  Often the person 
killed out of jealousy and rage is not a female but instead is her male 
romantic partner.
18
  In fact, the original categorical provocation exception 
to murder was not available if a husband killed his wife but instead applied 
to his killing her lover.
19
  Today such killings continue to be far too 
common.
20
  They may not be included in statistics on domestic homicide, 
but they result from the same inexcusable homicidal conduct that should be 
treated as murder, not manslaughter. 
Others and I
21
 continue to search for a more just way for American 
criminal law to treat domestic killings.  It is obvious what the law should 
do.  Killing because of jealousy and possessiveness should be treated as 
murder regardless of the genders of the parties.
22
  In contrast, those who 
                                                          
 16. The other set of provoked killings that should be murder are “gay panic” 
killings where the reason for committing homicide is that the victim, who was of the 
same sex as the killer, made non-violent sexual advances. This use of provocation has 
been shockingly common in Australia. Of the seventy-five people who successfully 
used provocation between 1990 and 2004 in New South Wales, eleven were “gay 
panic” cases.  See Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 3, at 29-30 (quoted in Gruber, 
Provocative, supra note 3, at 313 n.272); KATE FITZ-GIBBON, HOMICIDE LAW REFORM, 
GENDER AND THE PROVOCATION DEFENCE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 153 (2014) 
[hereinafter, FITZ-GIBBON, HOMICIDE LAW REFORM]; see also Lindsay v. The Queen, 
[2015] 255 C.L.R 272 (Austl.) (quashing a conviction for murder in a gay panic case). 
Today only two states, South Australia and Queensland, retain the “gay panic” basis for 
provocation. 
 17.  See Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 3, at 28 (citing Jenny Morgan, 
Critique and Comment, Provocation Law and Facts: Dead Women Tell No Tales, Tales 
Are Told About Them, 21 MELB. U.L. REV. 237, 256 (1997)). 
 18.  See id. 
 19.  See R v Mawgridge (1707) 84 ER 1107, 1114-15 (“When a man is taken in 
adultery with another man’s wife, if the husband shall stab the adulterer or knock out 
his brains, this is bare manslaughter: for jealousy is the rage of man, and adultery is the 
highest invasion of property.”). 
 20.  See FITZ-GIBBON, HOMICIDE LAW REFORM, supra note 16, at 27 (reporting that 
three out of eighteen cases in New South Wales where a provocation defense was 
successful involved a man killing his estranged wife’s lover); see also, DOBASH, supra, 
note 13, at 254. 
 21.  See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 9. 
 22.  Aya Gruber agrees: “I will fully accept the claim that sexist men who kill their 
partners are culpable for murder.” Gruber, Provocation, supra note 3, at 308. 
4
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kill their batterers out of fear often should not be held criminally 
responsible, and when they are held criminally responsible, they should 
rarely be found guilty of murder.  Such outcomes satisfy formal equality by 
treating like conduct alike for men and women.  Murder convictions for 
jealous killers and acquittals for domestic violence survivors who kill out 
of fear also satisfies substantive equality by condemning the mostly male 
domestic homicides that are based on possessiveness and excusing the 
mostly female domestic homicides that are based on fear of death or 
serious injury.
23
  Empirical evidence indicates that such outcomes comport 
with how social norms have been evolving
24
 and history shows that the 
law’s sympathy for people who kill out of jealousy is an aberration that 
developed in the early twentieth century and may no longer be the norm.
25
  
Our laws should reflect our values. 
III.  THE NEED FOR A PROVOCATION DEFENSE 
In her article, Gruber defends retaining the current rules surrounding 
provocation because we live in a system where criminal law already is too 
punitive and brutal.
26
  Gruber’s criticism of America’s criminal justice 
system is fair.  Like her, I want American jurisdictions to end the current 
un-nuanced and overly harsh treatment of convicted killers and, in 
particular, to abandon draconian mandatory sentencing.
27
 
In many U.S. jurisdictions, a successful provocation defense that results 
in manslaughter carries a substantially shorter sentence than the 
jurisdiction’s mandatory minimum sentence for murder
28
 that is often a life 
sentence.
29
  This presents a dilemma for those of us who seek to reform 
criminal law to ensure that domestic violence survivors who kill are treated 
justly, while at the same time eliminating the jealous heat of passion basis 
for a manslaughter verdict.  Without the provocation defense those who kill 
their batterers and those who kill out of jealous possessiveness both risk 
lengthy murder sentences.
30
  Furthermore, as Gruber notes, without the 
                                                          
 23.  See Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 3, at 29-30.  
 24.  See id. at 36, 68 (examining jury preference for manslaughter over murder for 
domestic violence survivors who kill and jury preference for murder over manslaughter 
for killing out of jealousy). 
 25.  See Ramsey, supra note 9, at 44. 
 26.  See Gruber, Provocation, supra note 3, at 325. 
 27.  See Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 3, at 44. 
 28.  This is also true of the extreme emotion disturbance (EED) defense enacted in 
the minority of U.S. jurisdictions that follow the Model Penal Code. See id.  
 29.  See Jonathan Simon, How Should We Punish Murder?, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 
1241 (2011). 
 30.  See id. at 1289. 
5
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provocation defense, other killers also face the overly punitive outcomes.
31
 
People who kill their batterers are particularly deserving of a choice 
other than acquittal or murder.  Whether male or female, at a minimum, 
they should be entitled to a partial defense and a shorter sentence, while 
also avoiding being labeled “murderers.”  Moreover, domestic violence 
survivors who kill their batterers often should not be treated as criminally 
culpable at all.  However, unless self-defense is modified to more 
accurately account for the impact of domestic violence on why people kill 
their abusers, a partial defense for such killers may still be needed to 
prevent the extreme injustice that can result when murder is the only 
option.
32
  For domestic violence survivors who kill, provocation provides a 
fallback.  It is necessary because self-defense remains biased.  The element 
of imminence
33
 and the failure of assessments of reasonableness to comport 
with an understanding of the dynamics of family violence create persistent 
problems for people who kill their batterers out of fear.  Thus, provocation 
is currently an important option when a domestic violence survivor is 




Mandatory sentencing and unenlightened self-defense laws continue to 
make revising or abolishing provocation undesirable.
35
  Even those who 
kill out of jealousy and rage or for other indefensible reasons, and who 
therefore should be found guilty of murder, will not always deserve life 
                                                          
 31.  Gruber, Provocation, supra note 3, at 312. 
 32.  See Simon, supra note 29, at 1282-83, 1296. 
 33.  In contrast, imminence is not an element of self-defense in any Australian 
jurisdiction but a matter to be considered in determining whether the accused’s 
defensive force was necessary. See Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316, 382 
(Austl.); see also Zecevic v DPP (Vic) (1987) 162 CLR 645, 662 (Austl.) But see 
Elizabeth Sheehy et al., Defences to Homicide for Battered Women: A Comparative 
Analysis of Laws in Australia, Canada and New Zealand, 34 SYDNEY L. REV. 467, 470-
71 (2012) (“Furthermore, there have now been a series of cases involving battered 
accused where the Australian courts have been sensitive to the need to look past the 
question of imminent attack in deciding whether lethal defensive force was necessary 
in such cases.”). 
 34.  Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 3, at 30, 60 (citing Rebecca Bradfield, The 
Treatment of Women Who Kill Their Male Partners Within the Australian Criminal 
Justice System 104-08 (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Tasmania) (on 
file with the American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law). 
 35.  Current law in the Australian state of Victoria now has no mandatory 
minimum sentence for murder, has abandoned the “imminence” requirement for self-
defense; has abolished provocation; and attempts to educate jurors about family 
violence in domestic homicide cases. It will be interesting to see if this combination 
results in acquittals of more domestic violence survivors who kill and convictions for 
murder of men who kill out of jealousy. See discussion infra. 
6
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sentences.
36
  As I noted in my 2006 Gender Equality article: “Until judges 
are given greater discretion in sentencing, and the law and application of 
self-defense is more understanding of battered women’s situations, current 
provocation law, as applied, may be the best that it can be.”
37
 
Mandatory sentencing has frozen the law of provocation in the United 
States.
38
  It is therefore not surprising that the lack of mandatory minimums 
in four out of six Australian states
39
 is a critical factor that has made 




IV.  AUSTRALIA’S REFORMS 
Before discussing the potential for some domestic violence survivors 
who kill to use the popular but controversial American Stand Your Ground/
Castle doctrine reforms, I examine Australian states’ most recent attempts 
to provide justice for both sets of domestic homicides.  Australia’s ongoing 
struggle to find a satisfactory alternative to common law provocation 
demonstrates that getting the treatment of domestic homicide right, without 
unintended consequences, remains challenging and may require further 
experimentation. 
Australia is an ideal legal laboratory.  The geographical size of the 
United States, it has fewer than twenty-five million people living in its six 
                                                          
 36.  I agree with Aya Gruber on this point. See Gruber, Provocative, supra note 3, 
at 312; see also Marc Mauer & David Cole, Opinion, How to Lock Up Fewer People, 
N.Y. TIMES, (May 23, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/24/opinion/sunday/how-to-lock-up-fewer-
people.html?  
We could cut sentences for violent crimes by half in most instances without 
significantly undermining deterrence or increasing the threat of repeat 
offending. Studies have found that longer sentences do not have appreciably 
greater deterrent effects; many serious crimes are committed by people under 
the influence of alcohol or drugs, who are not necessarily thinking of the 
consequences of their actions, and certainly are not affected by the difference 
between a 15-year and a 30-year sentence. For the same conduct, the U.S. 
imposes sentences on average twice as long as those the British impose, four 
times longer than the Dutch, and five to 10 times longer than the French. One 
of every nine people in prison in the United States is serving a life sentence. 
 37.  Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 3, at 68. 
 38.  Id. at 42. 
 39.  New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania and Western Australia. 
 40.  Mandatory minimums have explicity been given as the reason why South 
Australia chose to retain common law provocation. See LEGISLATIVE REVIEW COMM., 
PARLIAMENT OF S. AUSTL., 53 PARLIAMENT, Rep. of the Legislative Review Committee 
into the Partial Defence of Provocation 9 (Comm. Print 2014). 
7
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states.
41
  The two states with the most people, Victoria and New South 
Wales, have fewer than six and eight million people respectively.  It is 
therefore relatively easy to track all the domestic homicides in each state.  
In addition, the practice in most Australian states of relying on law reform 
commissions to guide the legislators in their law making is a helpful 
feature.
42
  One of the law reform areas that most Australian states have 
been actively engaged in for more than a decade is domestic homicide.
43
  
During that time Australia has become a leader in experimenting with 
alternatives to the traditional provocation doctrine.
44
 
In every Australian state, lawmakers have recently confronted, and 
responded to, the justice problems presented by the partial defense of 
provocation;
45
 most have also modified their self-defense laws.
46
  
Furthermore, unlike the Stand Your Ground/Castle doctrine reforms 
enacted in the majority of American states,
47
 the impetus for Australian 




In 2003, with almost no discussion, the small island state of Tasmania 
became the first common law jurisdiction in the world to abolish 
provocation.
49
  In 2005, after a thorough consideration of various 
alternatives by the Victoria Law Reform Commission (VLRC), Victoria 
followed Tasmania’s lead and abolished the provocation defense.
50
  
However, Victoria also created a lesser offense of defensive homicide,
51
 
and amended its self-defense statute.
52
  The express reason for these 
additional changes was to help assure that the abolition of provocation 
                                                          
 41.  The populations are approximately as follows: Queensland (4.8 million), 
Tasmania (519,000), New South Wales (7.7 million), South Australia (1.7 million), 
Western Australia (2.6 million), Victoria (6.1 million). AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF 
STATISTICS, http://www.abs.gov.au (last visited January 16, 2017). 
 42.  See Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 3, at 52-53. 
 43.  Id. at 49-50. 
 44.  Id. at 50. 
 45.  See FITZ-GIBBON, HOMICIDE LAW REFORM, supra note 16, at 91. 
 46.  See id. at 93. 
 47.  See Mary Ann Franks, Real Men Advance, Real Women Retreat: Stand Your 
Ground, Battered Women’s Syndrome, and Violence as Male Privilege, 68 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 1099, (2014) [hereinafter Franks, Real Men Advance] 
 48.  See, e.g., Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 3, at 54 (examining Victoria’s 
express purpose of helping battered women). 
 49.  Id. at 56-58. 
 50.  Id. at 57. 
 51.  Id. at 55 n.154. 
 52.  See id. at 56 n.159. 
8
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would not mean that those who kill out of fear would be at greater risk of 
being held guilty of murder.
53
  For the same reason, in 2009 Western 
Australia abolished provocation, replacing it with excessive (imperfect) 
self-defense.
54
  It is no coincidence that all three of these states allow 
judicial discretion in sentencing.  Neither murder nor manslaughter carries 
a mandatory minimum sentence;
55
 this lack of mandatory minimums allows 
judges to tailor sentences that fit the situation.
56
 
Because of Tasmania’s small population, it experiences very few 
homicides per year.
57
  Therefore, more time will be needed before it is 
known whether Tasmania’s abolition of provocation, without making other 
changes, has had its intended purposes of helping domestic violence 
survivors while condemning those who kill out of jealousy.
58
  Similarly, 
Western Australia has not had a sufficient number of homicides since 2009 
(when it abolished provocation) to provide meaningful data.  In contrast, 
Victoria’s population is large enough that, since its 2005 reform, there have 
                                                          
 53.  See id. at 54. 
54. See Criminal Law Amendment (Homicide) Act Num. Acts No. 29 2008 (W. A.) s 
12 (Austl.). The only other common law jurisdictions to abolish provocation are New 
Zealand and, oddly enough, Texas. See also Crimes (Provocation Repeal) Amendment 
Act 2009, ss 1-5 (N.Z.); S.B. 1067, 73rd Leg. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1994). Since 1994, 
instead of heat of passion being a partial defense, Texas Penal Code § 19.02 expressly 
allows provocation to be raised in sentencing and if the defendant proves it by the 
preponderance of evidence, “the offense is a felony of the second degree.” But see TEX. 
PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (West 2015). In reality, however, the level of sentencing if 
heat of passion is found in the sentencing phase is the same as it was when it was a 
partial defense to murder. Because of other aspects of Texas law, it was still possible 
for a jealous husband who killed his wife and injured her new partner to receive only 
four months in jail! CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN 42-43 (2003) 
(discussing the Watkins case). 
55. Paige Darby et al., Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Bill 
2014, RESEARCH BRIEF NO. 8  (Parliamentary Libr. & Info. Serv. Dep’t. of Parliament 
Serv., Vic, Austl.) July 2014, at 22-23 [hereinafter Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 
2014]. 
 56.  Concerns have been raised about the consideration of provocation in 
sentencing as merely shifting victim blaming to another setting. See FITZ-GIBBON, 
HOMICIDE LAW REFORM, supra note 16, at 252-54.  
 57.  See Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 3, at 58 n.170; see also Darby, 
Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at Appendix B. 
 58.  Today provocation may be considered as a form of mitigation in the 
sentencing phase. See Tyne v Tas [2005] 15 Tas. R. 221, (Ct. of Criminal App.) 
(Austl.) If provocation is at issue, the accused has the burden of proving mitigating 
circumstances by the preponderance of evidence in the sentencing phase instead of the 
prosecution having to prove no provocation beyond a reasonable doubt prior to 
abolition of the defense in 2003. See Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra 
note 55, at 19.  
9
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been a substantial number of homicides where defensive homicide was 
charged, including a few cases where women have killed their partners.
59
  I 
therefore turn my focus to Victoria’s 2005 law, what the post-reform 
reported cases have revealed, and the additional law reform that resulted in 
2014. 
A.  Victoria 
Like the partial defense of excessive self-defense/imperfect self-defense, 
defensive homicide requires that killers subjectively but unreasonably 
believe their actions are necessary to defend against death or “really serious 
injury.”
60
  From November 2005 (when the offense of defensive homicide 
first became available) through August 2013, it was successfully used 
twenty-eight times, both at trial and through plea-bargaining.
61
  In a stark 
example of unintended consequences, twenty-four of the twenty-eight 
killers who pled to or were found guilty of defensive homicide were men; 
only two of these cases involved intimates or former intimates.
62
  In 
                                                          
 59.  See Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at Appendix B. 
 60.  Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 3 (stating self-
defense is available when the killer meets two elements: (1) believes her actions are 
necessary against the infliction of death or really serious injury, and (2) has reasonable 
grounds for holding that belief). For a description on an American version of imperfect 
self-defense, see People v. Beltran, 301 P.3d 1120, 1131 (Cal. 2013) (distinguishing 
imperfect self-defense from provocation). This partial defense is available in a minority 
of American jurisdictions.  LEE, supra note 55 at 134-35 (2003).   
  Victoria chose to abolish provocation and enact defensive homicide as a 
separate offense instead of reinstituting the partial defense of excessive self-defense 
that VLRC had recommended that also would similarly have resulted in manslaughter 
for killing out of unreasonable fear. Some commentators criticized this decision as 
leading to unnecessary complexity and confusion. See Oliver Milman, Victoria Will 
Scrap ‘Defensive Homicide’ and Offer Simpler Test for Self-Defence, THE GUARDIAN 
(June 22, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/22/victoria-will-scrap-
defensive-homicide-and-offer-simpler-test-for-self-defence; see also Kellie Toole, 
Defensive Homicide on Trial in Victoria, 39 MONASH U. L. REV. 473, 479 (2013) 
[hereinafter Toole, Defensive Homicide] (arguing that the separate offense limits 
transparency in the plea bargaining process).  But see Ramsey, supra note 9, at 76 
(describing the difference between excessive self-defense and defensive homicide as 
“mostly expressive.”),  
 61. Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 28 (Appendix B: 
Defensive Homicide Convictions). 
 62.  Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 28.  One of the 
domestic homicides committed by a man was the killing the new lover of his former 
partner. R v Edwards [2008] Vict. Sup. Ct. 297 (Austl.).  The other highly controversial 
case is R v Middendorp, where a man killed his female domestic partner.  R v 
Middendorp [2010] Vict. Sup. Ct. 202. (Austl.).  See infra note 72 and accompanying 
text.  
10
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contrast, of the four women guilty of defensive homicide, three killed an 
intimate or former intimate.
63
  Thus, defensive homicide led to pleas of, or 
convictions for, manslaughter (instead of acquittal or conviction for 




There was public outcry because the main use of defensive homicide was 
not by domestic violence survivors (the intended beneficiaries of the 2005 
reform).  News articles complained that habitually violent offenders had 
hijacked the new offense;
65
 some academic commentators, most notably 
Professor Kate Fitz-Gibbon,
66
 criticized it similarly.
67
  In 2014, Victoria’s 
legislature abolished defensive homicide, less than ten years after this new 
crime had been created.
68
  As a result, Victoria, like Tasmania, now has no 
intermediate manslaughter option between acquittal and murder for 
intimate homicides.  Instead, again like Tasmania, judges can now consider 
provoking conduct in the sentencing process after a conviction for murder 
and have the discretion to impose the sentence they deem appropriate.
69
 
The reasons defensive homicide was abolished in Victoria deserve 
                                                          
 63.  Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 28. 
 64.  Marie Virueda & Jason Payne, AUSTL. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, Homicide in 
Australia: 2007-08 National Homicide Monitoring Program Annual Report 25 (2010) 
(stating that men commit about eighty percent of homicides in Australia.). 
 65.  Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 8 n.35. 
 66.  See, e.g., id., at 8 n.36-37; Kate Fitz-Gibbon, Abolishing Defensive Homicide 
Will Benefit Female Victims and Offenders, THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 3, 2013, 11:33 
PM) http://theconversation.com/abolishing-defensive-homicide-will-benefit-female-
victims-and-offenders-18484. 
 67.  See Kellie Toole, Self-Defense and the Reasonable Woman: Equality Before 
the New Victorian Law, 36 MELB. U. L. REV. 250, 286 (2012) [hereinafter Toole, 
Reasonable Woman].  
 68.  The Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Bill 2014 
received Assent in September 2014. It took effect on November 2, 2014. VICTORIAN 
LEGISLATION AND PARLIAMENTARY DOCUMENTS, http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au 
(last visited February 15, 2016); see Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra 
note 55. 
 69.  Victorian judges use the “instinctive synthesis” approach to sentencing. See 
SENTENCE ADVISORY COUNCIL, SENTENCE APPEALS IN VICTORIA, SUMMARY PAPER, 3 
(Aug. 2012):  
Under the ‘instinctive synthesis’ approach set out in Australian common law 
and followed in Victoria, the sentencing judge must identify all the factors that 
are relevant to the sentence, discuss the significance of each factor and then 
make a decision as to the appropriate sentence given all the facts of the case. 
Only at the end of this process does the judge determine the sentence. While 
judges are encouraged to state the factors that they have taken into account in 
determining the sentence, they are discouraged from quantifying the precise 
weight given to any single factor. 
11
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further scrutiny.  One concern leading to abolition was the belief that the 
players in the legal system were using it as a “catch-all” middle-ground 
offense for the purpose of plea deals.
70
  As a result, in some cases the 
defendant might never have even asserted facts meeting the elements of 
defensive homicide but negotiated manslaughter in the process of plea-
bargaining.  A few trial outcomes also indicated that defensive homicide 
sometimes benefited male abusers the same way provocation had done 
before the 2005 reforms.
71
  The most cited example of this was Luke 
Middendorp who stabbed his petite female partner in the back and then 
successfully asserted a claim of defensive homicide at trial.
72
  Similarly, 
Kevin Roy Edwards pled guilty to defensive homicide after he killed his 
female ex-partner’s new lover in a typical “jealous killing” scenario.
73
  
These cases suggest that, in practice, the law’s treatment of male violence 
retained at least some of the pre-reform status quo in Victoria.
74
 
Another criticism of defensive homicide was that it relied on the premise 
that many domestic violence survivors who kill out of fear do so 
unreasonably; in reality, reasonable people might kill to protect themselves 
if faced with repeated violence.
75
  Therefore, some claim that, like the use 
of Battered Women’s Syndrome, domestic homicide tends to pathologize 
battered women.
76
  Instead, critics argued that it is often society’s lack of 
                                                          
 70.  Kellie Toole believes that it is what began to happen.  Toole, Defensive 
Homicide, supra note 61, at 503; see also Asher Flynn & Kate Fitz-Gibbon, 
Bargaining with Defensive Homicide, 35 MELB. L. REV. 905, 931 (2011).  
 71.  Elissa Hunt, Defensive homicide law hijacked by career criminals, drug 




 72.  Paul Anderson, Girlfriend killer Luke John Middendorp loses appeal bids, 
HERALD SUN (Mar. 22, 2012, 4:30 AM), 
http://www.heraldsun.com.au/archive/news/girlfriend-killer-luke-john-middendorp-
loses-appeal-bids/news-story/8b8e33228329f6cf7472ecceb874ed96. For a detailed 
description of this case, see FITZ-GIBBON, HOMICIDE LAW REFORM, supra note 15, at 
181-88. 
 73.  Elissa Hunt, Man who kicked ex-partner’s new boyfriend to death jailed. 
HERALD SUN (Aug. 12, 2008, 10:00 AM) 
http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/victoria/jail-for-kicking-murder/story-e6frf7kx-
1111117182718.  
 74.  At least one “gay panic”/homosexual advance killing successfully pled 
defensive homicide See Toole, Defensive Homicide, supra note 61, at 497-98. 
 75.  See Ramsey, supra note 9, at 35, 75-76. 
 76.  See id. at 74; see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: 
Women’s Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 14 
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 213, 216-17 (1992). 
12
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understanding of the dynamics and dangers of domestic violence that make 
it appear that the conduct was unreasonable when, in fact, it was reasonable 
under the circumstances.
77
  As a result, defensive homicide was viewed as 
failing to remedy poor judge and jury understanding of family violence.
78
 
Commentator Kellie Toole closely examined the four domestic 
homicides committed by women in Victoria during the period from 2005, 
when defensive homicide became available, through 2012, two that were 
not prosecuted and two that resulted in the women being found guilty of 
defensive homicide.
79
  She concluded that these cases indicated that, even 
for domestic violence survivors, defensive homicide was often not 
achieving the legislature’s intended results.
80
 
The first two domestic homicides Toole examined were not pursued to a 
plea or conviction.  “SB” killed her sexually abusive stepfather, making 
this case an atypical “domestic homicide” because the deceased was not a 
romantic partner but, instead, a parent. Although the charges initially 
included defensive homicide, prosecutors chose not to pursue the case.
81
  
Eighteen-year-old SB had been sexually abused by the deceased on a near 
daily basis for years before she shot him.
82
  It is not surprising that 
prosecutors believed that a jury would refuse to convict her of anything.  A 
few months later, Freda Dimitrovski killed her abusive husband with a 
knife after he hit her in the face and then attacked their daughter.
83
  There 
was ample evidence of long-term domestic violence.
84
  The trial court 
                                                          
 77.  See Toole, Reasonable Woman, supra note 67, at 286 (examining twenty-four 
cases of defensive homicide between 2006 and 2012; eighteen offenders were men who 
killed other men, two were women who killed men, and one, Luke Middendorp, was a 
man who killed his female intimate partner); see also Darby, Victoria Crimes 
Amendment 2014, supra note 55 (giving a later summary of the twenty-eight cases 
through August 2013 where defensive homicide was used before it was repealed.). 
 78.  FITZ-GIBBON, HOMICIDE LAW REFORM, supra note 16, at 201-04. 
 79.  Two more women were prosecuted for domestic homicides subsequent to 
Toole’s article but before Victoria repealed this crime in 2014: Jemma Edwards who 
pled to defensive homicide of her husband in 2012 and Angela Williams who was 
convicted of defensive homicide of her husband in 2014. See R v. Edwards [2012] 
VSC 138 (Victoria Supreme Court) (Austl); see also DPP. v Williams [2014] VSC 304 
(Victoria Supreme Court) (Austl.). 
 80.  Toole, Reasonable Woman, supra note 67, at 250. 
 81.  See id. at 267-268; see also Michael Turtle, Charges Dropped against 
Teenager Who Killed Her Stepfather, ABC LOCAL RADIO PM, (Mar. 27 2009, 6:26 
PM), http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2008/s2528412.htm. 
 82.  Michael Turtle, supra note 81. 
 83.  Toole, Reasonable Woman, supra note 67, at 268. 
 84.  Id. at 269. 
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dismissed the charges, which included defensive homicide.
85
  In both of 
these cases defensive homicide was unnecessary because the women were 
able to show they acted in self-defense and therefore were legally 
guiltless.
86
  For this reason, Toole argued that the existence of defensive 
homicide was not important for them: 
Neither immediacy nor proportionality were at issue in either of the 
discontinued cases, and so neither is an example of a situation in which 
an abused woman has traditionally been disadvantaged.
87
 
In contrast to Toole, Victoria’s Department of Justice concluded that the 
outcomes for SB and Dimitrovski showed that enacting defensive homicide 
provided a major improvement “to the criminal justice system in dealing 




For the domestic homicides committed by Karen Black
89
 and Eileen 
Creamer,
90
 defensive homicide was clearly relevant. However, Toole 
argued that these cases demonstrated that the availability of this crime 
created more problems than it solved.
91
 Black killed her male live-in 
partner after both had been drinking and it became evident that he was 
going to rape her, as he had done before.
92
  Black and her son provided 
ample history of sexual abuse, physical abuse, control and threats.
93
  
However, during those same accounts, Black said her partner “was never 
physically violent towards [her],” and that she “could not justify what 
happened.”
94
  Black’s conflicting testimony indicates that she may not have 
been willing to accept that the violence done to her was, in fact, violence.  
In the end, Black pleaded guilty to defensive homicide even though a jury 
might have reasonably found complete self-defense.
95
  According to Toole, 
the availability of defensive homicide proved problematic here because 
                                                          
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at 270. 
 87.  Id.  
 88.  CRIMINAL LAW – JUSTICE STATEMENT, DEFENSIVE HOMICIDE: REVIEW OF THE 
OFFENCE OF DEFENSIVE HOMICIDE: DISCUSSION PAPER 32-33 (VICTORIA DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE 2010) (Austl.) [hereinafter DISCUSSION PAPER]. 
 89.  See R v Black [2011] VSC 152, 3 (Vic Sup. Ct.) (Austl.); see also Darby, 
Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 31. 
 90. See R v Creamer [2011] VSC 196, 1 (Vic Sup. Ct.) (Austl.); see also Darby, 
Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 31. 
 91.  Toole, Reasonable Woman, supra note 67, at 271. 
 92.  Id. at 272. 
 93.  Id. at 272-73. 
 94.  Id. at 275. 
 95.  Id. at 278. 
14
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women like Black may plead to this crime even though they have a good 
chance of succeeding on complete self-defense.
96
  Black received a 
sentence of nine years in prison.
97
 
Toole may be right in Black’s case, but it is often unclear that providing 
an intermediate option is necessarily bad for women who may (or may not) 
be able to prove complete self-defense.  Whether to opt for a middle 
ground between acquittal and murder is a difficult calculus to assess and 
very fact specific.  Furthermore, when there is sentencing discretion, as 
exists in Victoria, pleading to defensive homicide in a case where the killer 
is a domestic violence survivor and the victim was her abuser, may lead to 
a short or suspended sentence without going through the trauma of a trial 
where the outcome could be a murder conviction.
98
 
In the fourth case discussed by Toole, Eileen Creamer killed her 
estranged husband during a fight about their sexual relationship, and then 
initially denied her involvement.
99
  The Creamers did not fit the usual 
pattern of a domestic violence relationship even though there was evidence 
that the deceased had previously hit Creamer.
100
  It lacked both the control 
and isolation factors that might cause an abuse victim to see killing the 
abuser as the only way out. Specifically, the deceased was preparing to 
move away to remarry his first wife and Creamer had been living with 
another partner.
101
  The Creamers’ open marriage and unconventional 
sexual conduct made it difficult to predict how a judge or jury might view 
Eileen Creamer. Thus, in Creamer’s case, if she really was in danger, 
defensive homicide may have been a shield against harsh value judgments 
of Creamer’s lifestyle.
102
  More problematic, however, defensive homicide 
may have allowed a woman who killed out of jealousy to plead to 
manslaughter even though murder was the more appropriate crime.
103
 
                                                          
 96. Id. (discussing the tendency of domestic violence victims to self-blame, to 
underestimate the danger of their situation, and to otherwise view their self-defense as 
not reasonable). 
 97.  Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 31. 
 98.  It is not clear whether they would have done better without it from the very 
few cases involving women who killed their intimates and were found guilty of 
manslaughter based on defensive homicide. Their sentences were comparable to the 
men who committed non-domestic homicides. See Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 
2014, supra note 55, at 28.  
 99.  Toole, Reasonable Woman, supra note 67, at 279. 
 100.  Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 31. 
 101.  Toole, Reasonable Woman, supra note 67, at 279. 
 102.  For example, a juror might mistake Creamer’s sexual habits for de facto 
consent to abuse; it would be interesting to research this case from an evidentiary point 
of view.  See id.  
 103.  Toole, Reasonable Woman, supra note 67, at 281 (discussing Creamer’s 
15
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The Creamer and Black cases indicate that defensive homicide does not 
necessarily serve its intended purpose even when domestic violence 
survivors kill their intimates.  These decisions thus provided some support 
for those who sought to repeal defensive homicide.  However, the impact 
of defensive homicide for domestic violence survivors remains sufficiently 
ambiguous.  The concern about men getting away with murder was likely 
the more persuasive reason for abandoning this short-lived experiment. 
There was serious opposition to the abolition of defensive homicide. 
Virtually all the domestic violence support services groups, the Law 
Institute of Victoria, and a substantial number of prominent academics 
opposed the repeal of defensive homicide.
104
  They noted the continuing 
risk that the many women who might be found guilty of manslaughter 
based on defensive homicide would be unable to make out a self-defense 
claim.
105
  They used Angela Williams’ case as an example.
106
  Williams 
killed her long-term partner, Kally, by hitting him in the back of the head 
with a pick-ax numerous times after they had been in a fight.
107
  Evidence 
clearly showed that Williams was a victim of repeated physical, sexual, and 
emotional abuse during their twenty-three year relationship.
108
  
Nevertheless, the jury rejected Williams’ claim of self-defense and 
convicted her of defensive homicide; she was sentenced to eight years.
109
  
The Domestic Violence Resource Centre Victoria (DVRCV) voiced their 
concern that “[h]ad defensive homicide been abolished at the time of her 
trial, Angela Williams may have been unjustly convicted of murder.”
110
 
                                                          
credibility at trial). 
 104.  See Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 10-13; see 
also Charlotte King, Lorana Bartels, Patricia Esteal & Anthony Hopkins, Did 
Defensive Homicide in Victoria Provide a Safety Net for Battered Women Who Kill? A 
Case Study Analysis, 42 MONASH U. L. REV. 138, 147 (2016); Nicola Wake, ‘His home 
is his castle. And mine is a cage’: A New Partial Defence for Primary Victims Who 
Kill, 66(2) N. IR. LEGAL Q. 151, 158 (2015). 
 105.  Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 11; Defensive 
Homicide an Essential Safety Net, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RES. CTR. VICTORIA (DVRCV) 
(June 23, 2014), http://www.dvrcv.org.au/knowledge-centre/our-blog/defensive-
homicide-essential-safety-net-victims [hereinafter Defensive Homicide]. 
 106.  See Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 11; see also 
DPP v Williams [2014] VSC 304, 1 (Vic Sup. Ct.) (Austl.). See generally King, supra 
note 104 (analyzing DPP v. Williams, [2014] VSC 304 (Vic. Sup. Ct.) (Austl) as a case 
study). 
 107.  DPP v Williams [2014] VSC 304, 1 (Vic Sup. Ct.) (Austl.). 
 108.  Id. at 4. 
 109.  Id. at 1, 7, 11. 
 110.  The flip side is that without the option of defensive homicide, the jury may 
have found her not guilty based on self-defense. See id.; see also King, supra note 104, 
at 175.  
16
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Despite the broad coalition of defenders who provided evidence that 
some battered women likely benefited from having defensive homicide 
available, Victoria’s legislature repealed it. It appears that the Victorian 
legislature decided that the social cost of the frequent reliance on defensive 
homicide by violent men, in much the same way they had previously used 
provocation in both domestic and non-domestic violence cases, outweighed 
the law’s possible benefit to a small number of women who killed their 
abusers but were unable to prove they acted in self-defense.
111
  Instead, 
Victoria’s lawmakers sought other means of assisting domestic violence 
survivors who killed their batterers through revising evidentiary rules
112
 
and providing better access to complete self-defense for people who kill out 
of fear.
113
  The revised language in the self-defense statute made it more 
subjective than the previous version.
114
  It is meant to be deferential to 
domestic violence victims; the defendant’s belief about the threat only 




When Victoria’s legislature abolished defensive homicide, it also revised 
evidence laws in an attempt to limit “victim blaming” at trial.
116
  Likewise, 
the Jury Directions were amended to educate juries on the effects of 
domestic violence, and encourage acquittal when the killer was a victim of 
                                                          
  Critics of the repeal also were concerned that the availability of defensive 
homicide was particularly beneficial to indigenous women who, due to discrimination, 
poverty and distrust of the justice system, were less likely to have equal access to 
justice. Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 11; cf. Aya Gruber, 
When Theory Met Practice: Distributional Analysis, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3211, 3222 
(2015) (quoting Aya Gruber, Murder, Minority Victims, and Mercy, 85 COLO. L. REV. 
129, 185 (2014) (“[G]iven the demographics of murder defendants [in the US],]. ‘the 
group most likely to be burdened by the elimination or limitation of the provocation 
defense is young men of color accused of non-intimate homicides and facing murder 
charges in one of the most punitive systems on earth.’”). 
 111.  Id. at 12. 
 112.  Id. at 16. 
 113.  Id. at 14. 
 114.  The statute reads: “322K Self-defence 
(1) A person is not guilty of an offence if the person carries out the conduct constituting 
the offence in self-defence. (2) A person carries out conduct in self-defence if — (a) the 
person believes that the conduct is necessary in self-defence; and (b) the conduct is a 
reasonable response in the circumstances as the person perceives them. (3) This 
section only applies in the case of murder if the person believes that the conduct is 
necessary to defend the person or another person from the infliction of death or really 
serious injury.” Id. at 15 (emphasis added); see also Crimes Amendment (Abolition of 
Defensive Homicide) Act 2014 (Vic) s 4 (Austl.) [hereinafter Crimes Amendment]. 
 115.  See Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 15.  
 116.  Id. at 7. 
17
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domestic violence.
117
  Equally important, Victoria’s self-defense statute 
that codified the common law
118
 already did not require that the threat be 
“imminent,” or that the response be “proportionate,” elements that have 
often been problematic for victims of domestic violence.
119
  Supporters of 
the repeal of defensive homicide, therefore, hope that domestic violence 
survivors who kill their abusers out of fear will view the 2014 changes, in 
addition to the lack of imminence or proportionality, sufficient to 
justifiably make them more willing to assert complete self-defense, where 
in the past they felt doing so was too risky.
120
 
B.  Reform in Other Australian Jurisdictions 
The legislatures of the other three Australian states, New South Wales, 
Queensland, and South Australia,
121
 while not abolishing provocation, have 
each examined it in the past decade. Both New South Wales and 
Queensland have modified common law provocation;
122
 only South 
Australia has retained traditional common law provocation.
123
  All three 
states’ criminal codes also include the partial defense of excessive self-
defense (imperfect self-defense) akin to defensive homicide.
124
 
1.  New South Wales 
New South Wales, the Australian state with the largest population, has 
                                                          
 117.  Id. at 17. 
 118.  Id. at 2 (citing Zecevic v DPP (Vic) [1987] 162 CLR 645, 661 (Austl.)). 
 119.  Id. at 2. 
 120.  Id. at 8. 
 121.  South Australia’s examination of provocation has been focused on another 
highly problematic use of provocation - gay panic cases – and it concluded that no 
change was necessary.  See LEGISLATIVE REVIEW COMMITTEE, Report of the 
Legislative Review Committee into the Partial Defence of Provocation 5 (PARLIAMENT 
OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA) 2014 [hereinafter South Australia Report 2014]; see also FITZ-
GIBBON, HOMICIDE LAW REFORM, supra note 16, at 99. 
 122.  FITZ-GIBBON, HOMICIDE LAW REFORM, supra note 16, at 92-93. 
 123.  The 2014 South Australia report concluded that changes to provocation were 
unnecessary were based on the South Australia appellate decision in R v Linsday which 
concluded that there no longer was a gay panic basis for provocation in South 
Australia.  See South Australia Report 2014, supra note 122, at 6 (citing R v Lindsay 
[2014] SASCFC 56 (Austl.). The High Court of Australia reversed R v Lindsay in 
2015. Nevertheless, as of the publication of this Article, the legislature in South 
Australia has retained provocation in its traditional form.  See Lindsay v The Queen 
[2015] HCA 16 (Austl.); see also Kate Fitz-Gibbon, Dr. Kate Fitz-Gibbon Responds to 
High Court’s Judgment in R v Lindsay, CRIMINOLOGY@DEAKIN: JUSTICE & HOMICIDE 
LAW (May 7, 2015), https://blogs.deakin.edu.au/criminology/dr-kate-fitz-gibbon-
responds-to-high-courts-judgment-in-r-v-lindsay. 
 124.  See infra Table, page 21. 
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no mandatory minimum sentence for murder.
125
  Its legislature has 
considered abolishing provocation on multiple occasions.
126
  Nevertheless, 
after exhaustive consideration of the pros and cons, New South Wales has 
retained provocation with substantial restrictions.
127
  The partial defense, as 
amended in 2014, is now called “extreme provocation.”
128
  This defense is 
only available if “the conduct of the deceased is a serious indictable 
offence (punishable by five years’ imprisonment or more).”
129
 
Extreme provocation will rarely if ever be satisfied when a domestic 
killing is committed out of jealousy since the homicide victim is unlikely to 
have been engaged in “a serious indictable offense.”
130
  However, there will 
often be situations where a battered woman kills her abuser that also does 
not meet the requirements for extreme provocation.  The New South Wales 
legislature therefore also provided domestic violence survivors who kill 
with the partial defense of excessive self-defense which is analogous to 
defensive homicide when their fear is found to be unreasonable.
131
  
Recently, a domestic violence survivor successfully argued this defense in 
R v. Silva.
132
  Of course, others accused of murder can also argue excessive 
self-defense.  It remains to be seen whether the availability of excessive 
self-defense will result in a repeat of the experience in Victoria, where most 
of the killers claiming unreasonable fear were not battered women but men 




                                                          
 125.  AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS, supra note 41; see also Darby, Victoria 
Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 22-23 (stating the population of New South 
Wales is 7.6 million people). 
 126.  Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 22-23. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. at 23. 
 129.  Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) pt 3, s 23 (Austl.). In addition, it is now the objective 
test for the loss of self-control by an “ordinary person,” as opposed to the previous 
subjective test of “an ordinary person in the position of the accused.”  See CRIM. TRIAL 
CTS. BENCH BOOK: DEFENCES [6-444] (2016) (Austl.) 
https://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/criminal/index.html; see also R 
v Turnbull [No. 25] (2016) NSWSC 831 at 80, 91 (Austl.). 
 130.  Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 23. 
 131.  Id. at 22-23. 
 132.  See [2015] NSW 148 (Austl.); see also King, supra note 104, at 174. Silva was 
sentenced to only a two-year suspended sentence, which suggests that the trial judge 
believed she came close to proving complete self-defense. 
 133. King, supra note 104. More research is needed concerning the effectiveness of 
this partial defense. The states that have excessive self-defense introduced it by statute 
within the last 15 years. It is not clear whether men committing non-domestic 
homicides have been using the defense frequently as occurred in Victoria, when the 
analogous crime of defensive homicide was instituted. 
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2.  Queensland 
Taking yet a different approach, in 2009, Queensland, in addition to 
restricting its provocation defense,
134
 also introduced a new partial defense 
explicitly for victims of domestic violence. It provides: 
Killing for preservation in an abusive domestic relationship[:] 
(1) A person who unlawfully kills another (the deceased) under 
circumstances that, but for the provisions of this section, would 
constitute murder, is guilty of manslaughter only, if— 
 (a) the deceased has committed acts of serious domestic violence 
against the person in the course of an abusive domestic relationship; and 
 (b) the person believes that it is necessary for the person’s 
preservation from death or grievous bodily harm to do the act or make 
the omission that causes the death; and 
 (c) the person has reasonable grounds for the belief having regard to 




There was concern that this specific defense might lead to pleas or 
convictions for manslaughter when acquittal was more appropriate, which 
was worrisome since murder has a mandatory life sentence in 
Queensland.
136
  However, notwithstanding the availability of the new 
partial defense, at least two juries acquitted women who killed their 




“Killing for Preservation” may be a model for jurisdictions seeking to 
provide substantive equality for domestic violence victims who kill abusers 
where, like many U.S. jurisdictions, there is a mandatory life sentence for 
murder.  This novel partial defense may allow manslaughter where a 
complete defense is unlikely, but still neither discourage seeking an 
acquittal based on complete self-defense in deserving cases, nor protect 




                                                          
 134.  Two restrictions were placed on provocation claims: words alone will not 
suffice and provocation is not available when the killing was because a domestic 
partner sought to end the relationship. Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) sch 1, s 304(2), s 
304(3) (Austl.).   
 135.  See id. at s 304B; id. (providing definitions for each element); see also Darby, 
Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 21 (citing Criminal Code (Abusive 
Domestic Relationship Defence and Another Matter) Amendment Act 2010 (Qld) s 3 
(Austl.), https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/LEGISLTN/ACTS/2010/10AC001.pdf). 
 136.  Darby, Victoria Crimes Amendment 2014, supra note 55, at 20-21. 
 137.  Sheehy, supra note 33, at 479 (criticizing partial defenses for killers who are 
domestic violence victims). 
 138.  FITZ-GIBBON, HOMICIDE LAW REFORM, supra note 16, at 98. 
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One change to Queensland’s partial defense should be made.  Unless 
self-defense no longer requires imminence and the experiences of battered 
women are factored into what is reasonable, the requirement in (c) that “the 
person has reasonable grounds for the belief having regard to the abusive 
domestic relationship and all the circumstances of the case” is too 
demanding.
139
  Victims of serious domestic violence who kill their batterers 
out of actual fear should not have to prove that their fear was reasonable in 
order to have murder reduced to manslaughter. 
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V.  ASSESSING FLORIDA’S CASTLE LAW AS A PARTIAL SOLUTION FOR 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS WHO KILL 
I now turn from Australia’s enlightened experimentation with partial 
defenses and reforming self-defense with its explicit intent to both benefit 
domestic violence survivors who kill and punish killings out of jealous 
possessiveness. My final focus is on the more vengeful and distinctly male 
“castle” laws in a legal regime where mandatory minimum sentencing for 
murder is the norm.
140
  Castle laws are not designed to remedy problems 
with the law of domestic homicide; however, they provide a strong basis 
for self-defense for the rare domestic violence survivor who kills her 
former intimate when he attempts to invade her home or vehicle, and even 
explicitly do so if there is a protective order in place.
141
  An opportunity 
exists to do more to provide substantive equality for those who kill out of 
fear.  I suggest modifying Queensland’s partial defense specifically 
designed for battered women (described earlier) to turn it into an additional 
basis for presuming a killing in the home was justifiable self-defense under 
Florida’s castle doctrine.  But first, I examine how most U.S. jurisdictions 
view “no duty to retreat,” Stand Your Ground, and the castle doctrine. 
In this area, American criminal law is unique.  The United States is 
culturally and legally very different from other common law countries in 
how it views and treats the duty, or lack of duty, to retreat when confronted 
with deadly violence.  Unlike everywhere else in the common law world, 
the majority rule in the United States, even prior to the recent law reform, 
has been that there is no duty to retreat in any place one is legally entitled 
to be. Stand Your Ground is nothing new for America. 
In contrast, other common law countries, including Australia, impose a 
duty to retreat unless there is necessity based on self-defense except in 
castle cases of home invasion.
142
  Thus, the rule everywhere, except the 
United States, is that only in your home may you stand your ground and not 
retreat even if it is safe to do so.  Furthermore, recent U.S. reforms to the 
universally recognized “no duty to retreat in your castle” law, that expand 
this to occupied vehicles and create a presumption of self-defense, have 
had no traction in other countries.  In fact, to others, America’s Stand Your 
Ground law and castle doctrine reform is viewed as very troubling and 
                                                          
 140.  JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 25 (5th ed. 2009); James 
Forman, Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Helped Make the War on 
Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 331, 360-61 (2009).  
 141.  FLA. STAT. § 776.013(2) (2014). 
 142.  See Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) sch 1, s 272(1)-(2) (Austl.); see also 
Caroline Forell, What’s Reasonable?: Self-Defense and Mistake in Criminal and Tort 
Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1401, 1403 n.5 (2010) [hereinafter, Forell, What’s 
Reasonable?]. 
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bizarre.
143
  Nevertheless, since these changes in the castle doctrine have 
been made in most American states, these laws should at least be modified 
to benefit some domestic violence survivors who kill in their homes.  
Otherwise, these women will have to prove self-defense, most likely by 




By 2014, at least thirty three states had enacted castle doctrine reform, 
modeled on Florida’s 2005 statute.
145
  Three main changes to traditional 
castle doctrine are now in effect in most American jurisdictions.  First, the 
places covered have been expanded, most notably to include any kind of 
occupied vehicle.
146
  Second, if one is entitled to self-defense, one is also 
immune from criminal prosecution and civil liability.
147
  Finally, and most 
importantly, there is a presumption that killing an intruder entering one’s 
occupied home or vehicle is self-defense.
148
  In contrast, this presumption 
does not apply when the person killed was entitled to be in the home or 
vehicle.
149
  This means domestic violence survivors who kill their batterers 
at home or in a car will usually be denied the reformed castle doctrine’s 
presumption of self-defense.  An example of this is Callie Eudora Adams’ 
case where she shot her husband, Rodney Adams, while they were both in 
their car.
150
  Ms. Adams claimed that she had been repeatedly battered 
during her marriage and responded with deadly force when her husband 
choked her and hit her in the back of the head, saying he would kill himself 
and her.
151
  Her Stand Your Ground claim was rejected in an immunity 
                                                          
 143.  See Kumuda Simpson, ‘Stand Your Ground’: America’s Violent Culture 
Written into Law, THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 5, 2014 10:03 PM) 
http://theconversation.com/stand-your-ground-americas-violent-culture-written-into-
law-22776. Of course, many legal commentators find this reform to be deeply 
problematic too. See e.g., Tamara Rice Lave, Shoot to Kill: A Critical Look at Stand 
Your Ground Laws, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 827, 858 (2013). 
 144.  Franks, Real Men Advance, supra note 47, at 1122. 
 145.  Mary Anne Franks, How Stand Your Ground Laws Hijacked Self-Defense, in 3 
GUNS AND CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF FIREARMS AND 
FIREARM POLICY 141, 141 (Glenn H. Utter ed., 2015) [hereinafter Franks, Stand Your 
Ground]. 
 146.  FLA. STAT. § 776.013(1)(a). 
 147.  Id. § 776.032(1).  
 148.  Id. § 776.013(1)(a). 
 149.  Id. § 776.013(3). 
 150.  Larry Hannan, Stand Your Ground Denied to Jackson Woman Who Killed 
Husband, FLORIDA TIMES UNION (June 13, 2014, 3:47 PM), 
http://jacksonville.com/news/crime/2014-06-13/story/stand-your-ground-denied-
jacksonville-woman-who-killed-husband. 
 151.  Id. 
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hearing and she was charged with second-degree murder.
152
  No 
presumption that she acted in self-defense was available to her because, 
instead of being attacked by a stranger, she was attacked by her husband 
who had a right to be in the car.
153
 
The brainchild of the National Rifle Association (NRA) and the 
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC),
154
 these Stand Your 
Ground reforms were misleadingly touted as woman-friendly.
155
  In reality, 
they are of little or no assistance in the most common situations where 
women actually are at risk.
156
  Marion Hammer, the first woman president 
of the NRA and main proponent of the Florida castle doctrine reform, fully 
recognized that the new castle presumption that killing is justifiable when 
one kills an intruder is not available to domestic violence survivors who 
kill their batterers unless the batterers are also unlawful intruders.
157
  
Instead, domestic violence survivors who kill have to prove they acted in 
self-defense.
158
  According to Hammer when promoting the NRA’s castle 
reform in Florida in 2005: 
The way the law is written, when it comes to domestic violence 
situations there is some prevailing law that is still in place but the law 
attempts to say that if in a domestic violence situation you are being 
beaten you may use self-defense, but you can’t simply take action 
against an estranged spouse who breaks into the home if they own the 
home. You have to be under attack before you use force in those 
situations. 
There was an effort by some of the attorneys on the Justice Committee to 
try to be sure that in restoring your self-defense rights and your right to 
protect your home that they did not set up scenarios where people could 
murder people they did not like and claim it was lawful self-defense.
159
 
In order to understand the impact of the new castle laws, it is useful to 
take a closer look at Florida’s law that has been the model for other 
                                                          
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  John Nichols, How ALEC Took Florida’s ‘License to Kill’ National, THE 
NATION (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/how-alec-took-floridas-
license-kill-law-national. 
 155.  Franks, Real Men Advance, supra note 47, at 1101.  
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Former NRA President Exposes the Lies and Misinformation Aimed at 
Florida’s ‘Castle Doctrine’ Law, CTR. FOR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (Nov. 3, 2005), 
http://www.cfif.org/htdocs/freedomline/current/in_our_opinion/marion-hammer-nra-
interview.htm. 
 158.  FLA. STAT. § 776.031(2) (2014). 
 159.  CTR FOR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM, supra note 158.  
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states.
160
  First, Florida’s self-defense law permits deadly force under 
section 776.012(2) without the necessity of retreating even if retreat is 
reasonable and safe. This is quite representative of the law of self-defense 
in the United States.
161
 
Florida law states: 
A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force if he or 
she reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force is 
necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or 
herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible 
felony. A person who uses or threatens deadly force in accordance with 
this subsection does not have a duty to retreat and has a right to stand his 
or her ground if the person using or threatening to use the deadly force is 




Like self-defense throughout the United States, Florida’s self-defense 
law is male-focused.
163
  Unlike some of the more recent Australian self-
defense laws,
164
 it is not designed to benefit battered women.  The common 
barriers to complete self-defense for battered women remain under this 
typical test: the requirements of “imminence” and the difficulty in 
establishing that her belief is “reasonable” because most decision makers 
involved are unfamiliar with the dynamics of domestic violence.
165
 
Turning from ordinary self-defense to killings in the home, Florida’s 
modified castle law presumes a killing was in self-defense under certain 
circumstances that focus on the traditional basis for the universal “no duty 
to retreat” rule when the killing occurs in the home: i.e., a reasonable belief 
(whether or not correct)
166
 that an intruder is trying to break in.  While 
home invasion historically focused on a man defending his family, home, 
and self from other men attempting forcibly to enter his private domain,
167
 
some women may benefit since it justifies their killing intruders as well.  
Thus, formal equality that has made the historically male castle defense 
                                                          
 160.  See FLA. STAT. §§ 776.012-.032 (2014). 
 161.  See, e.g.,OR. REV. STAT. § 161.209 (2015). 
 162.  FLA. STAT. § 776.012(1) (2014) (emphasis added). 
 163.  See id. § 776.013(3) (offering no presumption of self-defense if the person 
killed was entitled to be in the home or vehicle, favoring the abuser). 
 164.  For example, Victoria and other Australian states have removed the 
“imminence” requirement and created evidentiary rules and jury instructions with 
battered women in mind. 
 165.  See FLA. STAT. § 776.031(2) (2014). 
 166.  See Forell, What’s Reasonable?, supra note 143, at 409-13, 1428-32  
(describing men’s mistaken but justified defense of home and family). 
 167.  Jeannie Suk, The True Woman: Scenes from the Law of Self-Defense, 31 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 237, 252 (2008). 
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gender-neutral helps women who kill men breaking into their home or their 
vehicle. 
The presumption set out in section 776.013(1) reads as follows: 
(1) A person is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent 
peril of death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another when 
using defensive force that is intended or likely to cause death or great 
bodily harm to another if: 
(a) The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the 
process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and 
forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle; and 
(b) The person who uses or threatens to use defensive force knew or had 




The statute, however, also expressly states in 776.013(2) that the 
presumption is not available when: 
The person against whom the defensive force is used has the right to be 
in or is a lawful resident of the dwelling, residence, or vehicle, such as an 
owner, lessee, or titleholder, and there is not an injunction for protection 
from domestic violence or a written pretrial supervision order of no 
contact against that person . . .
 169
 
This exclusion from the presumption covers situations when a domestic 
violence survivor kills a live-in intimate; it clearly has domestic violence in 
mind.  Thus, domestic violence survivors who kill their violent husbands 
and boyfriends will usually have to raise the claim of self-defense, even if 
the killing is in the course of an attack by the deceased in the woman’s 
castle. 
In order to achieve substantive equality, people who kill their batterers 
should be treated more sympathetically than they are now.  Instead, the 
2005 castle doctrine reform created an ambiguity about whether domestic 
violence survivors who killed someone who was lawfully present in the 
home even had the right to stand their ground!
170
  The statute’s language 
providing a presumption of self-defense for killing intruders, combined 
with the language denying the presumption if the person killed had some 
form of property right to be there, except if there was a protective order 
against them, implied that perhaps a battered woman was required to retreat 
if she could do so safely before she would be justified in using deadly 
force.
171
  In contrast, before the statute was enacted, the Florida Supreme 
Court had expressly held that under the then existing law, battered women 
                                                          
 168.  FLA. STAT. § 776.013(1) (2014) (emphasis added). 
 169.  Id. § 776.013(2). 
 170.  Id. § 776.013(3). 
 171.  Id. § 776.013(1)-(3). 
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in such a situation did not have to retreat even if the person attacking them 
had a right to be in the home.
172
 
Fortunately, in 2014 the Florida Legislature cleared up this ambiguity by 
amending section 776.013(3) so that it now says: “[A] person who is 
attacked in his or her dwelling, residence, or vehicle has no duty to retreat 
and has the right to stand his or her ground and use or threaten to use force, 
including deadly force” in accordance with Florida’s statutory test for self-
defense.
173
  With this clarification, Florida’s reform provides a domestic 
violence survivor who kills a live-in batterer some potential to avoid 
prosecution.  If she asserts self-defense and if (this is a big if) her claim is 
found to be credible by someone in authority, she may have the benefit of 
the immunity provided by section 776.032: 
Immunity from criminal prosecution and civil action for justifiable use or 
threatened use of force[:] 
(1) A person who uses or threatens to use force as permitted in s. 
776.012, s. 776.013, or s. 776.031 is justified in such conduct and is 
immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for the use or 
threatened use of such force by the person . . . against whom the force 
was used or threatened. . . As used in this subsection, the term “criminal 




This immunity applies if a police officer chooses not to arrest the killer 
or, if she is arrested, the District Attorney decides not to prosecute.
175
  
Furthermore, even if arrest and prosecution ensue, the Florida Supreme 
Court has held that a person claiming self-defense can now demand a 
hearing in which, based on the preponderance of evidence, she can try to 
prove she was entitled to immunity.
176
  This immunity can mean the 
difference between freedom and life in prison, and domestic violence 
                                                          
 172.  Weiand v. State 732 So.2d 1044, 1051 (Fla. 1999) (overruling State v. Bobbit, 
415 So.2d 724 (Fla. 1982)). 
 173.  FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2014). The revisions to Florida’s 2005 Stand Your 
Ground/castle doctrine reforms came in response to the highly publicized case of 
Marissa Alexander. After being physically threatened, she fired a warning shot at her 
abusive husband in front of his two children. She was initially sentenced to 20 years in 
prison in 2012, but her conviction was overturned. She faced another trial with a 
possible penalty of sixty years before she agreed to a plea deal in November 2014. In 
support of the 2014 amendments, Marion Hammer said: “That’s abuse, that’s wrong, 
that’s what this bill is designed to stop.” Alexander was released from a Jacksonville 
jail in January 2015 under a plea deal of three years time served. See Franks, Real Men 
Advance, supra note 47, at 1118-19; Matt Galka, Warning Shot Bill Passes Legislature, 
CAPITOL NEWS SERVICE (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.flanews.com/?p=21239. 
 174.  FLA. STAT. § 776.032 (2014) (emphasis added). 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Dennis v. State, 51 So.3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010). 
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survivors who kill can have immunity too if they can convince someone 
with authority that they acted in self-defense.  But that’s the rub.
177
 
The continuing difficulty for many domestic violence survivors who kill 
to prove self-defense, when that is what justice calls for, makes it important 
that the law find ways to help some of them make their case.  For those 
who kill their batterers at a time of non-confrontation, the lack of 
imminence will make a successful claim of self-defense very difficult.
178
 
For those who kill their batterers during a confrontation, something less 
controversial than eliminating the imminence requirement, but more 
empowering and self-respecting that showing she suffered from Battered 
Women’s Syndrome, should be considered.  I therefore propose that in 
Florida and other reformed castle doctrine states, Queensland’s partial 
defense for domestic violence survivors who kill
179
 be modified.  This 
would create a presumption that the killing was in self-defense when a 
survivor kills her batterer and the following is proved: 
(a) the deceased has committed acts of serious domestic violence against 
the person in the course of an abusive domestic relationship; and 
(b) the person believes that it is necessary for the person’s or another’s 
preservation from imminent death or grievous bodily harm to do the act 
or make the omission that causes the death. 
Thus, section 776.013 would be amended to add another basis for a 
presumption that the killing was justified, in addition to the existing one for 
killing an intruder.
180
  Most people who kill women are men the women 
know, not strangers.
181
  Enacting this additional presumption would show 
that the all too common threats and attacks by intimates are taken just as 
seriously as the far rarer threats and attacks from strangers
182
 and that 
                                                          
 177.  See Hannan, supra note 151. 
 178.  See FLA. STAT. § 776.031 (2014). 
 179.  Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) sch 1 s 304B (Austl.); see supra note 136, and 
accompanying text. 
 180. See Hannan, supra note 151 and accompanying text. If this presumption had 
been in effect when Eudora Adams shot her husband in their car, she would have been 
presumed to have acted in self-defense. 
 181.  When Men Murder Women, VIOLENCE POL’Y CTR., (Sept. 2014), 
http://www.vpc.org/studies/wmmw2014.pdf (“The U.S. Department of Justice has 
found that women are far more likely to be the victims of violent crimes committed by 
intimate partners than men, especially when a weapon is involved. Moreover, women 
are much more likely to be victimized at home than in any other place.”). 
 182.  See The Truth About Guns and Self-Defense, THE WEEK (Nov. 1, 2015), 
http://theweek.com/articles/585837/truth-about-guns-selfdefense (“[T]he annual per 
capita risk of death during a home invasion [has been estimated] at 0.000002 percent – 
essentially zero.”); see also Stephanie Zvan, How Well Does Your Gun Protect You? 
ALMOST DIAMONDS (June 21, 2010), 
http://almostdiamonds.blogspot.com/2010/06/how-well-does-your-gun-protect-
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domestic violence is real violence.  Substantive equality would be served 
by providing women with the right to defend their homes, their castles, 
from those most likely to do them harm. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Domestic homicides cover both killing out of jealous possessiveness and 
domestic violence survivors who kill out of fear and despair. Australia 
continues to experiment with ways to provide real justice for both kinds of 
killings through the abolition or modification of the provocation defense; 
providing partial defenses that are intended for domestic violence survivors 
who kill; and making self-defense more hospitable to domestic violence 
survivors who kill. Much of this has been possible because many 
Australian states do not have mandatory minimum sentencing.
183
 
Until mandatory minimums are abolished in the United States, the 
provocation defense is likely to survive in its current form in order to 
provide imperfect justice for both groups of domestic killers as well as non-
domestic killers.
184
  However, more can be done for domestic violence 
survivors when they kill their batterers to give them a fair chance at 
proving justifiable homicide and thereby provide them with a more perfect 
form of justice.  In the majority of states that have enacted statutes like 
Florida’s 2005 Stand Your Ground/castle doctrine reform, a simple way to 
provide domestic violence survivors who kill with substantive equality is to 
create a presumption that the killing was justified.  Enacting a presumption 
like the one I propose would show that those who support these statutes 
also support gender equality. 
                                                          
you.html). Sadly, the person killed as an intruder may not be one. See e.g.,Patrick 
Brennan et al., Police Investigate Death of Teen Shot by Dad, CINCINATTI.COM (last 
updated Jan. 13, 2016, 5:42 AM), 
http://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/2016/01/12/police-teen-mistaken-intruder-
shot/78672506/.  
 183.  Any states in the U.S. that don’t have mandatory minimums should follow 
Australia’s lead and make self-defense more available to domestic violence survivors 
who kill, and eliminate provocation for people who kill out of jealousy and rage. 
 184.  See Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 3, at 30 and accompanying text 
(stating that while the provocation defense may still be necessary, the Model Penal 
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